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Abstract
Ensuring the privacy of training data is a growing concern since many machine learning models are
trained on confidential and potentially sensitive data. Much attention has been devoted to methods
for protecting individual privacy during analyses of large datasets. However in many settings, global
properties of the dataset may also be sensitive (e.g., mortality rate in a hospital rather than presence of a
particular patient in the dataset). In this work, we depart from individual privacy to initiate the study
of attribute privacy, where a data owner is concerned about revealing sensitive properties of a whole
dataset during analysis. We propose definitions to capture attribute privacy in two relevant cases where
global attributes may need to be protected: (1) properties of a specific dataset and (2) parameters of the
underlying distribution from which dataset is sampled. We also provide two efficient mechanisms and one
inefficient mechanism that satisfy attribute privacy for these settings. We base our results on a novel use
of the Pufferfish framework to account for correlations across attributes in the data, thus addressing “the
challenging problem of developing Pufferfish instantiations and algorithms for general aggregate secrets”
that was left open by [KM14].
1 Introduction
Privacy in the computer science literature has generally been defined at the individual level, such as differential
privacy [DMNS06], which protects the value of an individual’s data within analysis of a larger dataset. In this
paper, we are interested in privacy of attributes in a dataset, where an analyst must prevent global properties
of sensitive attributes in her dataset from leaking during analysis. For example, insurance quotes generated
by a machine-learned model might leak information about how many female and male drivers are insured by
the company that trained the model; voice and facial recognition models may leak the distribution of race and
gender among users in the training dataset [AMS+15, BG18]. Under certain circumstances, even releasing
the distribution from which the data were sampled may be sensitive. For example, experimental findings by a
pharmaceutical company measuring the efficacy of a new drug would be considered proprietary information.
The naive solution of removing sensitive attributes from the dataset is insufficient, as attributes are
often correlated, and protected information can still be leaked by releasing non-sensitive information about
the data. Machine learning models have been shown to learn sensitive attributes even when censorship is
applied or when the attributes are deemed irrelevant for the actual learning task [SS20, MSCS19, ZTO20].
In the algorithmic fairness literature, differential privacy has been used to protect sensitive attributes at
the individual level by, e.g., constructing classifiers where an individual’s label is differentially private with
respect to her race [DHP+12]. However, the study of attribute privacy at the dataset or distribution level is
limited, both in terms of a framework for reasoning about it and mechanisms for protecting it.
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1.1 Our Contributions
In this work we initiate the study of attribute privacy at the dataset and distribution level and establish the
first formal framework for reasoning about these privacy notions. We identify two cases where information
about global properties of a dataset may need to be protected: (1) properties of a specific dataset and (2)
parameters of the underlying distribution from which dataset is sampled. We refer to the first setting as
dataset attribute privacy, where the data owner wishes to protect properties of her sample from a distribution,
but is not concerned about revealing the distribution. For example, even though the overall prevalence of
a disease may be known, a hospital may wish to protect the fraction of its patients with that disease. We
refer to the second setting as distributional attribute privacy, which considers the distribution parameter
itself a secret. For example, demographic information of the population targeted by a company may reveal
information about its proprietary marketing strategy. These two definitions distinguish between protecting a
sample and protecting the distribution from which the dataset is sampled.
We propose definitions for capturing dataset and distributional attribute privacy by instantiating a general
privacy framework called the Pufferfish framework [KM14]. This framework was originally introduced to
handle correlations across individual entries in a database; we show it can also be used for correlations across
database-level attributes. As a result, both of our privacy definitions can be satisfied using the Wasserstein
mechanism [SWC17], which is a general tool for providing Pufferfish privacy (see Section 6 for more details).
However, this mechanism is computationally expensive and may require computing an exponential number
of pairwise Wasserstein distances, which is not feasible in most practical settings. To this end, we propose
efficient mechanisms in the following settings:
• For dataset attribute privacy, we consider a special class of functions and attribute properties and
propose a mechanism based on Gaussian noise (in Section 4 we articulate that the similarity with
DP Gaussian Mechanism is based solely on the nature of the noise). We show that the mechanism
can be applied to datasets where (1) attributes follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution and (2)
the function to be computed on the data and the attribute property to be protected are linear in the
number of records in the dataset (e.g., mean). Note that with the help of variational auto-encoders
(VAEs) [KW14], one can obtain a Gaussian representation of the data even if a dataset does not come
from a Gaussian distribution. Moreover, such disentangled representations can be based on interpretable
attributes [HMP+17] that are easier for specifying which attributes require protection, particularly
when the original data are complex (e.g., pixels on an image vs. the gender of the person in it). 1
• For distributional attribute privacy, we consider a model where dependencies between the attributes form
a Bayesian network. This model helps us capture the extent to which a sensitive attribute parameter
affects parameters of attributes in the query, and we add noise proportional to this influence. Although
our mechanism is inspired by the Markov Quilt mechanism [SWC17], the difference in settings prompts
several changes, including a different metric for measuring influence between the variables.
Finally, we note that although [KM14] identified that “there is little focus in the literature on rigorous
and formal privacy guarantees for business data”, they leave “the challenging problem of developing Pufferfish
instantiations and algorithms for general aggregate secrets” as future work.
1.2 Related work
Machine learning models have been shown to memorize and leak data used to train them, raising questions
about the release and use of these models in practice. For example, membership attacks [SSSS17] show
that models can leak whether certain records (e.g., patient data) were part of the training dataset or not.
Attribute (or feature) privacy attacks, on the other hand, consider leakage of attribute values at an individual
level [SS20, FJR15], and property inference attacks show that global properties about datasets can be
leaked [MSCS19, GWY+18, AMS+15].
1Though naive use of VAEs may not provide end-to-end privacy guarantees, it serves as an example that it is possible to
obtain a representation of non-Gaussian data with interpretable Gaussian features. We leave it as an interesting open question
on how to provide end-to-end privacy-preserving feature disentanglement.
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Differential privacy (DP) [DMNS06, DR14] guarantees individual-level privacy when publishing an output
computed on a database, by bounding the influence of any record on the output and adding noise. Importantly,
DP does not aim to protect population-level information, and was designed to learn global properties of a
dataset without sacrificing individual privacy. DP does provide group privacy guarantees for groups of k
correlated records, but these quantitative guarantees are only meaningful when k is small relative to the size
of the dataset. Syntactically, DP guarantees that if any individual record were to be changed—including all
attributes of that record—the result of the analysis would be approximately the same. For attribute privacy,
we seek similar guarantees if an entire attribute of the dataset were to be changed—including all individuals’
values for that attribute.
The Pufferfish framework [KM14] that we instantiate and describe in detail in the following sections,
can be seen as a generalization of differential privacy that explicitly states the information that needs to
be kept secret and the adversary’s background knowledge about the data. Blowfish privacy [HMD14] also
allows one to express secrets and publicly known information about the data, but expressed as constraints on
the data rather than distributions over data. We adapt the Markov Quilt Mechanism from [SWC17], who
also employ the Pufferfish framework [KM14] for private analysis of correlated data, although they focus
on individual-level privacy. Our focus instead on privacy of dataset properties and distributions leads to a
substantially different instantiation of the Pufferfish framework where the secrets are defined over attribute
values rather than individual records in the dataset.
Research on algorithmic fairness has proposed several definitions formalizing the idea that machine learning
models should not exhibit discrimination based on protected attributes (e.g., gender or race). Demographic
parity formalizes fairness by requiring that a classifier’s predicted label is independent of an individual’s
protected attributes. Our notion of dataset attribute privacy is a general framework where one can specify
what information about attributes need to be protected, with attribute independence being one such scenario.
However, our attribute privacy definitions would not be useful for satisfying other fairness notions that
explicitly incorporate protected attributes, such as affirmative action or fairness through awareness [DHP+12].
Moreover, techniques proposed to obtain fair representations of the training data [LSL+16, ZWS+13] have
been shown to still leak sensitive attributes [SS20] when applied in the privacy context.
2 Preliminaries
Pufferfish Privacy. The Pufferfish privacy framework [KM14] consists of three components: a set of secrets
S, a set of discriminative pairs Q ⊆ S × S, and a class of data distributions Θ. S is a set of possible facts
about the database that we might wish to hide. Q is the set of secret pairs (si, sj), si, sj ∈ S, that we wish
to be indistinguishable, where si and sj must be mutually exclusive. The class of data distributions Θ can be
viewed as a set of conservative assumptions about the underlying distribution that generates the database.
Definition 1 ((, δ)-Pufferfish Privacy [KM14, SWC17]2). A mechanism M is (, δ)-Pufferfish private in a
framework (S,Q,Θ) if for all θ ∈ Θ with X ∼ θ, for all secret pairs (si, sj) ∈ Q such that P (si|θ) 6= 0 and
P (sj |θ) 6= 0, and for all T ⊆ Range(M), we have
PM,θ(M(X) ∈ T |si, θ) ≤ exp()PM,θ(M(X) ∈ T |sj , θ) + δ.
The Wasserstein Mechanism proposed in [SWC17] and defined formally in Section 6 is the first general
mechanism for satisfying instantiations of Pufferfish privacy framework. It defines sensitivity of a function F
as the maximum Wasserstein distance between the distribution of F (X) given two different realizations of
secrets si and sj for (si, sj) ∈ Q. The mechanism then instantiates the Laplace mechanism by outputting
F (X) plus Laplace noise that scales with this sensitivity. Although this mechanism works in general for
any instantiation of the Pufferfish framework, computing Wasserstein distance for all pairs of secrets is
computationally expensive, and will typically not be feasible in practice.
2The original definition [KM14] and the one considered in [SWC17] is (, 0)-Pufferfish. We extend the definition to (, δ)-
Pufferfish in the natural way.
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[SWC17] also gave the Markov Quilt Mechanism (Algorithm 4 in Appendix A) for some special structures
of data dependence. It is more efficient than the Wasserstein Mechanism and also guarantees (, 0)-Pufferfish
privacy. The Markov Quilt Mechanism of [SWC17] assumes that the entries in the input database Y form a
Bayesian network, as defined below. These entires could either be: (1) the multiple attributes of a single
record when the database contained only one record, or (2) the attribute values across multiple records for a
single-fixed attribute when the database contained multiple attributes. Hence, the original Markov Quilt
Mechanism could not accommodate correlations across multiple attributes in multiple records, as we study in
this work. Full details of this algorithm are given in Appendix A.
Definition 2 (Bayesian Networks). A Bayesian network is described by a set of variables Y = {Y1, . . . , Yn}
and a directed acyclic graph G = (Y,E) whose vertices are variables in Y . The probabilistic dependence on Y
included by the network can be written as: Pr(Y1, . . . , Yn) = Π
n
i=1 Pr(Yi|parent(Yi)).
3 Attribute Privacy Definitions
Data model and representation. The dataset X contains n records, where each record consists of m
attributes. We view the dataset X as an n ×m matrix. In this work, we are interested in privacy of the
columns, which represent attributes that a data owner wishes to protect. Thus we refer to the matrix X
as X = [X1, . . . , Xm], where Xi is the column vector related to the ith attribute (column). In contrast,
traditional differential privacy [DMNS06, DR14] is concerned with privacy of the rows of the dataset matrix.
We let Xji denote ith attribute value for jth record.
Each record is assumed to be sampled i.i.d. from an unknown distribution, where attributes within a
single record can be correlated (e.g., consider height and weight). We use C ⊆ [m] to denote a set of indices of
the sensitive attributes that require privacy protection (e.g., race and gender may be sensitive attributes; hair
color may be non-sensitive). The data owner wishes to compute a function F over her dataset and release
the value (or estimate of the value) F (X) while protecting some information about the sensitive attributes.
Privacy notions. We distinguish between three kinds of attribute privacy, corresponding to three different
types of information the data owner may wish to protect.
Individual attribute privacy protects Xji for sensitive attribute i when F (X) is released. Note that
differential privacy provides individual attribute privacy simultaneously for all individuals and all attributes
[DMNS06], but does not protect against individual-level inferences from population-level statistics [Cor11].
For example, if a DP result shows a correlation between lung disease and smoking, one may infer that a
known-smoker in the dataset has an elevated likelihood of lung disease.
Dataset attribute privacy is applicable when the owner wishes to reveal F (X) while protecting the value
of some function g(Xi) for sensitive attribute i ∈ C (e.g., whether there were more Caucasians or Asians
present in the dataset).
Distribution attribute privacy protects privacy of a parameter φi that governs the distribution of ith
sensitive attribute in the underlying population from which the data are sampled.
The last two notions are the ones put forward in this paper and studied in detail. The difference between
them may be subtle depending on g and φ. For example, consider one setting where the sensitive attribute
is binary and g is the fraction of records where this attribute is 1, and another setting where the sensitive
attribute is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter φ. In this case, g can be seen as an estimate of φ
based on a sample. The difference becomes particularly relevant in settings where privacy is required for
realizations of the dataset that are unlikely under the data distribution, or settings with small datasets where
g is a poor estimate of φ.
Formal framework for attribute privacy. The standard notion of differential privacy is not directly
applicable to our setting since we are interested in protecting population-level information. Instead, we
formalize our attribute privacy definitions using the Pufferfish privacy framework of Definition 1 by specifying
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the three components (S,Q,Θ). The distributional assumptions of this framework are additionally useful for
formalizing correlation across attributes.
Definition 3 (Dataset Attribute Privacy). Let (Xj1 , X
j
2 , . . . , X
j
m) be a record with m attributes that is sampled
from an unknown distribution D, and let X = [X1, . . . , Xm] be a dataset of n records sampled i.i.d. from D
where Xi denotes the (column) vector containing values of ith attribute of every record. Let C ⊆ [m] be the
set of indices of sensitive attributes, and for each i ∈ C, let gi(Xi) be a function with codomain U i.
A mechanism M satisfies (, δ)-dataset attribute privacy if it is (, δ)-Pufferfish private for the following
framework (S,Q,Θ):
Set of secrets: S = {sia := 1[gi(Xi) ∈ U ia] : U ia ⊆ U i, i ∈ C}.
Set of secret pairs: Q = {(sia, sib) ∈ S × S : U ia ∩ U ib = ∅, i ∈ C}.
Distribution: Θ is a set of possible distributions θ over the dataset X. For each possible distribution D over
records, there exists a θD ∈ Θ that corresponds to the distribution over n i.i.d. samples from D.
This definition defines each secret sia as the event that gi(Xi) takes a value in a particular set U ia, and the
set of secrets S is the collection of all such secrets for all sensitive attributes. This collection may include all
possible subsets of U i, or it may include only application-relevant events. For example, if all U ia are singletons,
this corresponds to protecting any realization of gi(Xi). Alternatively, the data owner may only wish to
protect whether gi(Xi) is positive or negative, which requires only U ia = (−∞, 0) and U ib = [0,∞). The set of
secret pairs Q that must be protected includes all pairs of disjoint events on the same sensitive attribute. The
Pufferfish framework considers distributions θ over the entire dataset X, whereas we require distributions D
over records. We resolve this by defining Θ to be the collection of distributions over datasets induced by the
allowable i.i.d. distributions over records.
Definition 4 (Distributional Attribute Privacy). Let (Xj1 , X
j
2 , . . . , X
j
m) be a record with m attributes that
is sampled from an unknown distribution described by a vector of random variables (φ1, . . . , φm), where φi
parameterizes the marginal distribution of Xji conditioned on the values of all φk for k 6= i. The (φ1, . . . , φm)
are drawn from a known joint distribution P , and each φi has support Φ
i. Let X = [X1, . . . , Xm] be a dataset
of n records sampled i.i.d. from the distribution described by (φ1, . . . , φm) where Xi denotes the (column)
vector containing values of ith attribute of every record. Let C ⊆ [m] be the set of indices of sensitive
attributes.
A mechanism M satisfies (, δ)-distributional attribute privacy if it is (, δ)-Pufferfish private for the
following framework (S,Q,Θ):
Set of secrets: S = {sia := 1[φi ∈ Φia] : Φia ⊂ Φi, i ∈ C}.
Set of secret pairs: Q = {(sia, sib) ∈ S × S : Φia ∩ Φib = ∅, i ∈ C}.
Distribution: Θ is a set of possible distributions θ over the dataset X. For each possible φ = (φ1, . . . , φm)
describing the conditional marginal distributions for all attributes, there exists a θφ ∈ Θ that corresponds
to the distribution over n i.i.d. samples from the distribution over records described by φ.
This definition naturally parallels Definition 3, with the attribute-specific random variable φi taking the
place of the attribute-specific function gi(Xi). Although it might seem natural for φi to define the marginal
distribution of the ith attribute, this would not capture the correlation across attributes that we wish study.
Instead, φi defines the conditional marginal distribution of the ith attribute given all other φ 6=i, which does
capture such correlation. This also allows the distribution θ over datasets to be fully specified given these
parameters and the size of the dataset.
Since both of our attribute privacy definitions are instantiations of the Pufferfish privacy framework, one
could easily apply the Wasserstein Mechanism [SWC17] to satisfy (, 0)-attribute privacy for either of our
definitions. However, as described in Section 2, implementing this mechanism requires computing Wasserstein
distance between the conditional distribution on F (X) for all pairs of secrets in Q. Computing exact
Wasserstein distance is known to be computationally expensive, and our settings may require exponentially
many computations in the worst case. In the remainder of the paper, we provide efficient algorithms that
satisfy each of these privacy definitions, focusing on dataset attribute privacy in Section 4 and distributional
attribute privacy in Section 5, before returning to the (inefficient) Wasserstein Mechanism in Section 6.
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4 The Gaussian Mechanism for Dataset Attribute Privacy
In this section we consider dataset attribute privacy as introduced in Definition 3. In this setting, an
analyst wants to publish a function F evaluated on her dataset X, but is concerned about an adversary
observing F (X) and performing a Bayesian update to make inferences about a protected quantity gi(Xi).
We propose a variant of the Gaussian Mechanism [DR14] that satisfies dataset attribute privacy when F (X)
conditioned on gi(Xi) follows a Gaussian distribution, with constant variance conditioned on gi(Xi) = a
for all a. Although this setting is more restrictive, it is still of practical interest. For example, it can be
applied when X follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution and gi and F are linear with respect to the
entries of X, as we show in the instantiation of our mechanism in Section 4.2. We also note that using
variational auto-encoders (VAEs) [KW14, HMP+17], it is possible to encode data from other distributions
using a Gaussian representation with interpretable features. This would then allow an analyst to specify
which latent features are deemed sensitive for the data, even if the original features are less descriptive (e.g.,
pixels on an image vs. the gender of the person in it).
4.1 Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism
Algorithm 1 presents the Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism for answering a real-valued query F (X)
while protecting the values of gi(Xi) for i ∈ C. Much like the Gaussian Mechanism for differential privacy
[DR14], the Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism first computes the true value F (X), and then adds a
Gaussian noise term with mean zero and standard deviation that scales with the sensitivity of the function.
However, sensitivity of F in the attribute privacy setting is defined with respect to each secret attribute Xi
as,
∆iF = max
θ∈Θ
max
(sia,s
i
b)∈Q
∣∣E [F (X)|sia, θ]− E [F (X)|sib, θ]∣∣ . (1)
This differs from the sensitivity notion used in differential privacy in two key ways. First, we are concerned
with measuring changes to the value of F (X) caused by changing secrets sia corresponding to realizations
of gi(Xi), rather than by changing an individual’s data. Second, we assume our data are drawn from an
unknown underlying distribution θ, so F (X) is a random variable. Our attribute privacy sensitivity bounds
the maximum change in posterior expected value of F (X) in the worst case over all distributions and pairs of
secrets for each attribute. We note that if F (X) is independent of the protected attribute Xi, then ∆iF = 0
and no additional noise is needed for privacy. The Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism of Algorithm 1
further benefits from the inherent randomness of the output F (X). In particular, it reduces the variance σ2
of the noise added by the conditional variance of F (X) given gi(Xi) and θ, as the sampling noise can mask
some of the correlation. Hence, privacy also comes for free if the function of interest has low correlation with
the protected attributes.
Algorithm 1 can be easily extended to handle vector-valued queries with F (X) ∈ Rk and sensitive functions
gi over multiple attributes by changing ∆iF in Equation (1) to be the maximum `2 distance rather than
absolute value. Additionally, the noise adjustment for each attribute should be based on the conditional
covariance matrix of F (X) rather than the conditional variance.
Theorem 1. The Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism APGM(X,F, {gi}, C, {S,Q,Θ}, , δ) in Algorithm
1 is (, δ)-dataset attribute private when F (X)|gi(Xi) is Gaussian distributed for any θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ C.
Privacy follows from the observation that the summation of F (X) and the Gaussian noise Z is Gaussian
distributed conditioned on any secrets, and the probabilities of the output conditioned on any pairs of secrets
have the same variance with mean difference ∆iF . Since we bound the ratio of the two probabilities caused
by shifting this variable, the analysis reduces to the proof of Gaussian mechanism in differential privacy.
Proof. Fix any pair of secrets (sia, s
i
b) ∈ Q for a fixed secret attribute Xi under any θ ∈ Θ. Recall that sia
denotes the event that gi(Xi) ∈ U ia. Let Z ∼ N (0, σ2) denote the Gaussian noise added in Algorithm 1. We
have [M(X)|sia, θ] = [(F (X) + Z)|sia, θ] = [F (X)|sia, θ] + Z, because Z is independent of sia and θ. Since we
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Algorithm 1 Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism, APGM(X,F, {gi}, C, {S,Q,Θ}, , δ) for dataset at-
tribute privacy.
Input: dataset X, query F , functions gi for protected attributes i ∈ C, framework {S,Q,Θ} , privacy
parameters , δ
Set σ2 = 0, c =
√
2 log(1.25/δ).
for each i ∈ C do
Set ∆iF = maxθ∈Θ max(sia,sib)∈Q
∣∣E [F (X)|sai ]− E [F (X)|sbi]∣∣.
if (c∆iF/)
2 −minθ∈Θ Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) ≥ σ2 then
Set σ2 = (c∆iF/)
2 −minθ∈Θ Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ).
if σ2 > 0 then
Sample Z ∼ N (0, σ2).
Return F (X) + Z.
else Return F (X).
have assumed that F (X)|gi(Xi) is Gaussian distributed and the summation of two Gaussians is Gaussian,
M(X)|sia follows a Gaussian distribution with mean E [F (X)|sai , θ] and variance Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2.
The ratio of probabilities of seeing an output w on a pair of secrets (sia, s
i
b) in the worst case is as follows,
max
(sia,s
i
b)∈Q
∣∣∣∣∣log exp(−1/2(Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2)(w − E [F (X)|sai , θ])2exp(−1/2(Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2)(w − E [F (X)|sbi , θ])2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣log exp(−1/2(Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2)w2)exp(−1/2(Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2)(w + max(sai ,sbi )∈Q E [F (X)|sai , θ]− E [F (X)|sbi , θ])2)
∣∣∣∣∣ , (2)
where (2) follows from shifting the variable w to w + E [F (X)|sai , θ]. We observe that the probability ratio
can be viewed as the probability ratio in the Gaussian Mechanism in differential privacy with noise draw from
N (0,Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2), and query sensitivity max(sia,sib)∈Q E
[
F (X)|sia
] − E [F (X)|sib]. Then, our
analysis reduces to the proof of the Gaussian Mechanism in differential privacy. The Gaussian Mechanism
for differential privacy with
Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2 ≥ 2 log(1.25/δ)
(
max(sia,sib)∈Q E
[
F (X)|sia, θ
]− E [F (X)|sib, θ]

)2
ensures that with probability at least 1− δ, we have
P (M(X) ∈ T |sia, θ) ≤ exp()P (M(X) ∈ T |sib, θ) + δ,
for any T ⊆ Range(M). Equivalently, we have
σ2 ≥ 2 log(1.25/δ)
(
max(sia,sib)∈Q E
[
F (X)|sia, θ
]− E [F (X)|sib, θ]

)2
−Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ).
Taking the maximum over i for all secret attributes and over all θ ∈ Θ, we require
σ2 ≥ max
i∈C
[
2 log(1.25/δ)(∆iF/)
2 −min
θ∈Θ
Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ)
]
which will ensure that the ratio of the probabilities that the algorithm M(X) outputs a query value in any
subset T on any pair of secrets for any θ ∈ Θ is bounded by  with probability at least 1− δ.
High probability additive accuracy bounds on the output of Algorithm 1 can be derived using tail bounds
on the noise term Z based on its variance σ2. However, σ2 does not have a general closed form. In general,
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if F (X) is independent of, or only weakly correlated with the protected functions gi(Xi), then no noise is
needed is preserve dataset attribute privacy, and the mechanism can output the exact answer F (X). On the
other hand, if F (X) is highly correlated with gi(Xi), the mechanism must add a noise term with large σ
2,
resulting in low accuracy with respect to the true answer. To make these statements more precise, Section
4.2 provides a concrete instantiation of Algorithm 1.
4.2 Instantiation with Gaussian distributed data
In this section, we show an instantiation of our Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism when the joint
distribution of the m attributes is multivariate Gaussian. The privacy guarantee of this mechanism requires
that F (X)|gi(Xi) is Gaussian distributed, which is satisfied when gi and F are linear with respect to the
entries of X. For simplicity of illustration, we will choose both F (X) and all gi(Xi) to compute averages.
As a motivating example, consider a dataset that consists of students’ SAT scores Xs, heights Xh, weights
Xw, and their family income Xi. As a part of a wellness initiative, the school wishes to release the average
weight of its students, so F (X) = 1n
∑n
j=1X
j
w. The school also wants to prevent an adversary from inferring
the average SAT scores or family income of their students, so C = {s, i} and g(Xi) = 1n
∑n
j=1X
j
i for i ∈ C.
To instantiate our framework, let sia denote the event that g(Xi) = a, which means the average value
of column Xi is a. If g(Xi) has support U i, then the set of secrets is S = {sia : a ∈ U i, i ∈ C}, and the set
of secret pairs is Q = {(sia, sib) : a, b ∈ U i, a 6= b, i ∈ C}. Each θ ∈ Θ is a distribution over n i.i.d. samples
from an underlying multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean (µ1, . . . , µm)
T and covariance matrix (Vij),
i, j ∈ [m], where Vij = Vji is the covariance between Xi and Xj if i 6= j, and Vii is the variance of Xi.
Suppose we want to guarantee (, δ)-dataset attribute privacy through the Attribute-Private Gaussian
Mechanism. Then we need to first compute E
[
F (X)|sia
]
and Var(F (X)|sia) for each i ∈ C. Let j denote
the index of the attribute averaged in F (X). By the properties of a multivariate Gaussian distribution,
the distribution of F (X) conditional on g(Xi) = a is Gaussian N (µ¯a, V¯ ), where µ¯a = µj + VijVii (a − µi)
and V¯ = 1n (Vjj −
V 2ij
Vii
). We define the diameter of U as d(U) = maxa,b∈U |a− b|. The sensitivity is:
∆iF = max(sia,sib)∈Q |µ¯a − µ¯b| =
Vij
Vii
maxa,b∈U |a− b| = VijVii d(U). To ensure (, δ)-dataset attribute privacy
for protected attribute Xi, the variance of the Gaussian noise must be at least (c
Vijd(U)
Vii
)2 − 1n (Vjj −
V 2ij
Vii
)
for c =
√
2 log(1.25/δ) as in Algorithm 1. Adding Gaussian noise with variance σ2 = maxi∈C{(cVijd(U)Vii )2 −
1
n (Vjj −
V 2ij
Vii
)} will provide (, δ)-dataset attribute privacy for all protected attributes.
We note that σ2 is monotonically increasing with respect to Vij . That is, our Attribute-Private Gaussian
Mechanism will add less noise to the output if the query F is about an attribute which has a low correlation
with the protected attributes.
So far we have discussed about the case when Θ only consists of one distribution, in order to show the
impact of Vij . For the general case, the sensitivity ∆iF is maxθ∈Θ
Vij
Vii
d(U), and the noise is scaled with
variance σ2 = maxi∈C{(cmaxθ∈Θ Vijd(U)Vii )2 −minθ∈Θ 1n (Vjj −
V 2ij
Vii
)}.
5 The Markov Quilt Mechanism for Distributional Attribute Pri-
vacy
In this section we consider distributional attribute privacy, as introduced in Definition 4, and develop a
mechanism that satisfies this privacy definition. Recall that in this setting, an analyst aims to release
F (X) while protecting the realization of a random parameter φi, which describes the conditional marginal
distribution of the ith attribute, given the realization of all φk for k 6= i for all other attributes. This
formalization implies that all (column) attribute vectors Xi are mutually independent, conditional on the set
of parameters (φ1, . . . , φm).
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5.1 Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism
We base our mechanism on the idea of a Markov Quilt, which partitions a network of correlated random
variables into those which are “near” (XN ) a particular variable Xi, and those which are “remote” (XR).
Intuitively, we will use this to partition attributes into those which are highly correlated (XN ) with our
sensitive attributes, and those which are only weakly correlated (XR).
Definition 5 (Markov Quilt). A set of nodes XQ in a Bayesian network G = (X,E) is a Markov Quilt for
a node Xi if deleting XQ partitions G into parts XN and XR such that Xi ∈ XN and XR is independent of
Xi conditioned on XQ.
We quantify the effect that changing the distribution parameter φi of a sensitive attribute Xi has on a
set of distribution parameters φA (corresponding to a set of attributes XA) using the max-influence. Since
attributes are mutually independent conditioned on the vector (φ1, . . . , φm), the max-influence is sufficient
to quantify how much a change of all values in attribute Xi will affect the values of XA. If φi and φA are
independent, then XA and Xi are also independent, and the max-influence is 0.
Definition 6. The max-influence of an attribute Xi on a set of attributes XA under Θ is:
eΘ(XA|Xi) = sup
θ∈Θ
max
φai ,φ
b
i∈Φi
max
φA∈ΦA
log
P (φA|φai , θ)
P (φA|φbi , θ)
.
The sensitivity of F with respect to a set of attributes A ⊆ [m], denoted ∆AF , is defined as the maximum
change that the value of F (X) caused by changing all columns XA. Formally, we say that two datasets X,X
′
are A-column-neighbors if they are identical except for the columns corresponding to attributes in A, which
may be arbitrarily different. Then ∆AF = maxX,X′ A-column-neighbors |F (X)− F (X ′)|. Although changing
XA may lead to changes in other columns, these changes are governed by the max influence, and will not
affect attributes that are nearly independent of Xi.
Observe that the event that XR and Xi are independent conditional on XN is equivalent to the event
when φR and φi are independent conditional on φN , which is why we can define the Markov Quilt based on
Xi. However, since the distribution of Xis are governed by φis, the max-influence score must be computed
using φis rather than Xis.
The mechanism. We extend the idea of the Markov Quilt Mechanism in [SWC17] to the attribute privacy
setting as follows. Let A ⊆ [m] be a set of attributes over which F is computed. For example, F may compute
the average of a particular attribute or a regression on several attributes. At a high level, we add noise
to the output of F scaled based on the sensitivity of F with respect to XNs. However, when computing
the sensitivity of F we only need to consider sensitivity of F with respect to A ∩N , i.e., the queried set of
attributes A that are in the “nearby” set of the protected attribute. If the query F is about attributes that
are all in the “remote” set XRi and the max-influence on the corresponding Markov quilt is less than the
privacy parameter , then ∆A∩NF is simply 0 and the mechanism will not add noise to the query answer.
Theorem 2. The Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism APMQM(X,F,A,C, {S,Q,Θ}, ) in Algo-
rithm 2 is (, 0)-distributional attribute private.
Proof. First, consider the case when G = ∅, which means there are no Markov quilt partitions such that the
max-influence score is less than . In this case, for a fixed secret attribute Xi, the mechanism will simply add
Laplace noise scaled with ∆AF . The privacy follows from Laplace Mechanism in differential privacy.
Let us consider the case when G 6= ∅. Below we bound the probability distribution for a single outcome w.
For the set of outcomes T , the proof can be extended to bound the integral of the probability distribution
over the set T . We fix any pair of secrets (sia, s
i
b) ∈ Q for a fixed secret attribute Xi under any θ ∈ Θ. Here
sia denotes the event that φi = a, and we consider the more general case later. Let Z be the Laplace noise as
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Algorithm 2 Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism, APMQM(X,F,A,C, {S,Q,Θ}, ) for distributional
attribute privacy.
Input: dataset X, query F , index set of queried attributes A, index set of sensitive attributes C, framework
{S,Q,Θ}, privacy parameter .
for each i ∈ C do
Set bi = ∆AF/.
Set Gi := {(XQ, XN , XR) : eΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤ } to be all possible Markov quilts of Xi with max-influence
less than .
if Gi 6= ∅ do
for each (XQ, XN , XR) ∈ Gi do
if ∆A∩NF/(− eΘ(XQ|Xi)) ≤ bi then
Set bi = ∆A∩NF/(− eΘ(XQ|Xi)).
Sample Z ∼ Lap(maxi∈C bi).
Return F (X) + Z
generated in Algorithm 2. If there exists a Markov quilt for Xi, i ∈ C, with max-influence score less than ,
then for any attribute Xj ∈ A:
max
a,b
P (M(X) = w|φi = a, θ)
P (M(X) = w|φi = b, θ)
= max
a,b
P (F (X) + Z = w|φi = a, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|φi = b, θ)
= max
a,b
max
R∪Q
P (F (X) + Z = w|φi = a, φR∪Q = v¯, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|φi = b, φR∪Q = v¯, θ)
P (φR∪Q = v¯|φi = a, θ)
P (φR∪Q = v¯|φi = b, θ)
= max
a,b
max
R∪Q
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi = a, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi = b, θ) ·
P (XR∪Q = xR∪Q|φR∪Q = v¯, θ)
P (XR∪Q = xR∪Q|φR∪Q = v¯, θ)
· P (φR∪Q = v¯|φi = a, θ)
P (φR∪Q = v¯|φi = b, θ) , (3)
where the final equality Equation (3) follows from the independence between XR∪Q and φi given φR∪Q = v¯,
and xR∪Q denotes a realization of the XR∪Q columns. For a fixed XR∪Q, F (X) can vary by at most ∆A∩NF ,
and therefore, the first ratio is bounded by exp(− exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi))). The second ratio in Equation (3) is 1,
and the third ratio in Equation (3) is bounded by exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi)). Then Equation (3) is bounded above by
exp(− exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi))) exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi)) = exp(). For the general case when sia := 1[φi ∈ Φia] : Φia ⊂ Φi,
similarly, for any Φia and Φ
i
b, we have,
P (M(X) = w|φi ∈ Φia, θ)
P (M(X) = w|φi ∈ Φib, θ)
≤max
R∪Q
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi ∈ Φia, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi ∈ Φib, θ)
P (φR∪Q = v¯|φi ∈ Φia, θ)
P (φR∪Q = v¯|φi ∈ Φib, θ)
(4)
≤max
R∪Q
max
a∈Φia,b∈Φib
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi = a, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi = b, θ) maxa∈Φia,b∈Φib
P (φR∪Q = v¯|φi = a, θ)
P (φR∪Q = v¯|φi = b, θ) . (5)
The first ratio in Equation (5) is bounded by exp(− exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi))) and the second ratio is bounded by
exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi)), so Equation (5) is bounded above by exp(), and the theorem follows.
Example 1. Consider a dataset that consists of students’ SAT scores Xs, heights Xh, weights Xw, gender Xg,
and their family income Xi, where these variables form a Bayesian network as in Figure 1. The school wishes
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to release the number of students that are taller than 5′6′′, while protecting the distribution of family income
of their students with privacy parameter . In this case, C = {i}, A = {h} and F (X) = ∑nj=1 1[Xjh > 5′6′′].
Consider a Markov quilt for Xi: Q = {g}, N = {i, s}, R = {h,w}. Then A ∩N = ∅, so we can safely release
F (X) =
∑n
i=1 1[X
j
h > 5
′6′′] without additional noise.
Next consider the case when the school wishes to release the number of students that are taller than 5′6′′
and have SAT score > 1300. Then, F (X) =
∑n
j=1 1[(X
j
h > 5
′6′′) ∧ (Xjs > 1300)] and A = {h, s}. In this case
we can still use the same Markov quilt as before, but now A ∩N = {s}. The mechanism will add Laplace
noise scaled with ∆{s}F/(− eΘ(Xg|Xi)).
Family 
income Gender
SAT 
score
Height
Weight
Figure 1: Bayesian Network of five at-
tributes where income is a sensitive at-
tribute.
It is instructive to contrast the above mechanism to the Markov
Quilt Mechanism of [SWC17], presented fully in Appendix A. The
most important difference is that the mechanism in [SWC17] was
not designed to guarantee attribute privacy. It provides privacy
of the values Xji but does not protect the distribution from which
Xji is generated. This difference in high-level goals leads to three
key technical differences. Firstly, the definition of max-influence
in [SWC17] measures influence of a variable value on values of other
variables. This is insufficient when one wants to protect distributional
information, as Xi may take a range of values while still following a
particular distribution (e.g., hiding the gender of an individual in a
dataset vs. hiding the proportion of females to males in this dataset.)
Secondly, while it is natural to consider L-Lipschitz functions to
bound sensitivity when one value changes (as is done in [SWC17]), this is not applicable to settings where
the distribution of data changes, since this may change all values in a column. As a result, we do not restrict
F in this way. Finally, the mechanisms themselves are different as [SWC17] consider answering query F over
all attributes of an individual. As a result, they need to consider sensitivity of a function to all the “nearby”
attributes. In contrast, we only consider sensitivity of those “nearby” attributes that happen to be in the
query (i.e., those in A).
6 The Wasserstein Mechanism for General Attribute Privacy
The Wasserstein Mechanism [SWC17] (Algorithm 3) is a general mechanism for satisfying Pufferfish privacy;
Algorithm 3 is (, 0)-Pufferfish private for any instantiation of the Pufferfish framework [SWC17]. It defines
sensitivity of a function F as the maximum Wasserstein distance W∞ between the distributions of F (X)
under two different realizations of secrets si and sj for (si, sj) ∈ Q, and then outputs F (X) plus Laplace
noise that scales with this sensitivity. The distance metric W∞ denotes the ∞-Wasserstein distance between
two probability distributions, formally defined below.
Definition 7 (∞-Wasserstein distance, W∞). Let µ, ν be two probability distributions on R,3 and let Γ(µ, ν)
be the set of all joint distributions with marginals µ and ν. The ∞-Wasserstein distance between µ and ν is
defined as :
W∞(µ, ν) = inf
γ∈Γ(µ,ν)
max
(x,y)∈support(γ)
|x− y| . (6)
The ∞-Wasserstein distance is closely related to optimal transportation. Each γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν) can be viewed
as a way to shift probability mass between µ and ν, and the cost is max(x,y)∈support(γ) |x− y|. For discrete
distributions, the ∞-Wasserstein distance is the minimum of the maximum distance that any probability
mass moves to transform µ to ν.
3In general, Wasserstein distance can be defined on any metric space. We will use it only over the real numbers with the
Euclidean metric.
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Algorithm 3 Wasserstein Mechanism (X,F, {S,Q,Θ}, ) [SWC17]
Input: dataset X, query F , Pufferfish framework {S,Q,Θ}, privacy parameter 
for all (si, sj) ∈ Q and all θ ∈ Θ such that P (si|θ) 6= 0, and P (sj |θ) 6= 0 do
Set µi,θ = P (F (X)|si, θ), µj,θ = P (F (X)|sj , θ).
Calculate W∞(µi,θ, µj,θ).
end for
Set W = sup(si,sj)∈Q,θ∈ΘW∞(µi,θ, µj,θ).
Sample Z ∼ Lap(W/).
Return F (X) + Z
Since our framework is an instantiation of Pufferfish privacy, the Wasserstein Mechanism provides a
general way to protect either dataset attribute privacy or distributional attribute privacy, when instantiated
with the appropriate Pufferfish framework (S,Q,Θ). This is stated formally in Theorem 3 and illustrated in
Examples 2 and 3 below.
Theorem 3. The Wasserstein Mechanism (X,F, {S,Q,Θ}, ) in Algorithm 3 is (, 0)-dataset attribute private
and (, 0)-distributional attribute private.
Despite the general purpose nature of the Wasserstein Mechanism for achieving attribute privacy, it is
known that computing Wasserstein distance is computationally expensive [AM19]. Instantiating Algorithm
3 to satisfy attribute privacy may require computing Wasserstein distance for exponentially many pairs of
secrets, one for each subset of values of gi(Xi) or φi. This motivates our study of the Attribute-Private
Gaussian Mechanism (Algorithm 1) and the Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism (Algorithm 2), which
are both computationally efficient for practical use.
Example 2 (Wasserstein Mechanism for Dataset Attribute Privacy). Consider two binary attributes X1 and
X2, where X1 is the non-sensitive attribute and X2 is the sensitive attribute. Suppose the dataset contains
data from four people, and let the underlying distribution and dependence between X1 and X2 is characterized
by the following probability distributions:
P (X1 = 1|X2 = 1) = p1 and P (X1 = 1|X2 = 0) = p2, (7)
Suppose 0.4 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.6 and 0.4 ≤ p2 ≤ 0.6. The analyst wishes to release the summation of X1, F (X) =∑4
j=1X
j
1 , while protecting the summation of X2, so g(X2) =
∑4
j=1X
j
2 . To instantiate our framework, let
s2a denote the event that g(X2) = a. The support of g(X2) is U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Then the set of secrets is
S = {s2a : a ∈ U}, and the set of secret pairs is Q = {(s2a, s2b) : a, b ∈ U , a 6= b}. Each θ ∈ Θ is a certain pair
of p1 and p2 such that 0.4 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.6 and 0.4 ≤ p2 ≤ 0.6.
Consider the pair of conditional probabilities µa,θ = P (F (X) = ·|s2a, θ) and µb,θ = P (F (X) = ·|s2b , θ). The
worst case Wasserstein distribution between the pair of conditional probability distributions is reached when
p1 = 0.4, p2 = 0.6, and a = 0, b = 4 when the two conditional probabilities differ the most. We list the
conditional probabilities for this case in Table 1.
j 0 1 2 3 4
P (F (X) = j|g(X2) = 0) 0.0256 0.1536 0.3456 0.3456 0.1296
P (F (X) = j|g(X2) = 4) 0.1296 0.3456 0.3456 0.1536 0.0256
Table 1: Conditional probability distributions under two extreme secrets for dataset attribute privacy
Here, the Wasserstein distance W∞(P (F (X)|g(X2 = 0)), P (F (X)|g(X2 = 4)) = 1, since the optimal
transportation is moving the mass from 1 to 2 and 4 to 3, and the Wasserstein mechanism will add Lap(1/)
noise to F (X).
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The mechanism with group differential privacy would add Lap(4/), which gives worse utility. We
note that the noise we add depends largely on the underlying distribution class Θ. For example, when
Θ = {0.3 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 0.7}, the worst case Wasserstein distance is 2 and the mechanism will add Lap(2/)
noise to F (X). When Θ = {0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1}, the worst case Wasserstein distance is 4, and the Wassertein
mechanism will add the same amount of noise as group differential privacy.
Example 3 (Wasserstein Mechanism for Distributional Attribute Privacy). Consider the same setting as
Example 2: a dataset of four people with two binary attributes X1 and X2, where X1 is non-sensitive and
X2 is sensitive. Let the underlying distribution and dependence between realized attributes X1 and X2 still
be governed by (7), and for simplicity fix p1 = 0.4 and p2 = 0.6. In the setting of distributional attribute
privacy, we are interested in the conditional marginal distribution parameters of Xi given the parameter for
Xj, rather than the realization of Xj. We denote the Bernoulli distribution parameter for X1 and X2 as φ1
and φ2, respectively. According to (7), we have φ1 = 0.4φ2 + 0.6(1− φ2) = 0.6− 0.2φ2.
The analyst wishes to release the summation of X1, F (X) =
∑4
j=1X
j
1 , while protecting the distribution
parameter φ2 for X2. To instantiate our framework, we let s
2
a denote the event that φ2 = a, and we suppose
the support of φ2 is Φ
2 = [0.2, 0.8]. The set of secrets is S = {s2a : a ∈ Φ2}, and the set of secret pairs is
Q = {(s2a, s2b) : a, b ∈ Φ2, a 6= b}. Each θ ∈ Θ is a certain pair of φ1 and φ2 such that Φ2 = [0.2, 0.8] and
φ1 = 0.6− 0.2φ2.
In this case, the support for φ1 is [0.44, 0.56]. Consider the pair of conditional probabilities µa,θ =
P (F (X) = ·|s2a, θ) and µb,θ = P (F (X) = ·|s2b , θ). The worst case Wasserstein distribution between the pair of
conditional probability distributions is reached when a = 0.8 and b = 0.2 when the two conditional probabilities
differ the most. We list the conditional probabilities for this case in Table 2.
j 0 1 2 3 4
P (F (X) = j|φ2 = 0.8) 0.0983 0.3091 0.3643 0.1908 0.0375
P (F (X) = j|φ2 = 0.2) 0.0375 0.1908 0.3643 0.3091 0.0983
Table 2: Conditional probability distributions under two extreme secrets for distributional attribute privacy
The Wasserstein distance W∞(P (F (X)|φ2 = 0.8), P (F (X)|φ2 = 0.2) = 1, since the optimal transportation
is moving the mass from 1 to 2 and 4 to 3, and the Wasserstein mechanism will add Lap(1/) noise to F (X).
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A Additional Preliminaries
In this appendix we review the Markov Quilt Mechanism of [SWC17] for satisfying Pufferfish privacy.
This algorithm assumes that the entries in the input database Y form a Bayesian Network (Definition 2).
These entires could either be: (1) the multiple attributes of a single record when the database contained
only one record, or (2) the attribute values across multiple records for a single-fixed attribute when the
database contained multiple attributes. Hence, the original Markov Quilt Mechanism could not accommodate
correlations across multiple attributes in multiple records, as we study in this work.
The following definition measures influence of a variable value on values of other variables. One can
compare this to Definition 6 used in the Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism, which instead measures
max-influence of a parameter of the probability distribution of a variable on the distribution of parameters of
other variables, as is needed in the attribute privacy setting.
Definition 8 (Variable-Max-Influence [SWC17]). The maximum influence of a variable Yi on a set of
variables YA under Θ is:
evΘ(YA|Yi) = sup
θ∈Θ
max
a,b∈Y
max
yA∈Ycard(YA)
log
P (YA = yA|Yi = a, θ)
P (YA = yA|Yi = b, θ) .
Recall the definition of a Markov Quilt (Definition 5), which is used in this mechanism.
Algorithm 4 Markov Quilt Mechanism (Y, F, {S,Q,Θ}, ) [SWC17]
Input: database Y , L-Lipschitz query F , Pufferfish framework {S,Q,Θ}, privacy parameter .
for each Yi do
Let Gi := {(YQ, YN , YR) : YQ is a Markov Quilt of Yi}
for all YQ (with YN , YR ) in Gi do
if evΘ(YQ|Yi) <  then
Set b(YQ) =
|YN |
−evΘ(YQ|Yi) .
else
Set b(YQ) =∞.
end if
end for
Set bi = minYQ∈Gi b(YQ).
end for
Set bmax = maxi bi.
Sample Z ∼ Lap(L · bmax).
Return F (Y ) + Z
The Markov Quilt Mechanism [SWC17] given in Algorithm 4 guarantees (, 0)-Pufferfish Privacy.
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